The question of whether the Road Accident Fund (RAF) attracts liability for an intentional collision was recently considered by the Gauteng Division of the High Court in the matter of Mashengani v Road Accident Fund (Case No. 15034/2020) [2025] ZAGPPHC.
The matter arose from a claim instituted by the plaintiff, Oscar Mashengani, against the RAF for bodily injuries sustained on 1 January 2019. The plaintiff alleged that he was struck by a motor vehicle while walking on a gravel road near Fish Point Tavern in Vleifontein. His pleaded case was premised on the alleged negligence of the insured driver, Tendai Edwin Ramunenyiwa. However, evidence before the court revealed that the collision occurred in the context of a physical altercation between the plaintiff and Mr Ramunenyiwa, who had deliberately driven his vehicle into the plaintiff during the fight.
The court examined the statutory framework under the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 (RAFA), particularly section 17(1), which deals with the RAF's obligation to compensate third parties for loss or damage arising from bodily injury caused by the driving of a motor vehicle if the injury was due to the negligence or other wrongful act of the driver or of the owner of the motor vehicle. Judge Moshoana emphasised that the RAF’s liability is limited to accidents involving negligence. Intentional acts fall outside the scope of the RAF’s mandate. The court noted that the term “accident” presupposes fortuity and excludes deliberate conduct.
Comparing the RAF scheme to traditional insurance policies, the court found that the term "accident" in liability policies, where the insured event is damages arising from an accident, requires the insured peril to be fortuitous. Intentional acts cannot be accidents. Therefore, as the name of the RAF suggests, it is a fund for accidents, not for deliberate or intentional acts. Since negligence was neither proven nor supported by the evidence, the plaintiff failed to discharge the onus resting on him.
On the question of whether Mr Ramunenyiwa's conduct could fall within the meaning of “other wrongful act” for which compensation may be claimed, the court was not convinced that the words above could mean anything other than negligence, noting that had the legislature intended to cover intentional acts, it would have been expressly stated so. In any event, the plaintiff had not pleaded that his claim fell within the ambit of "other wrongful act". On the contrary, he had approached the matter on the basis of negligence. The court highlighted the trite principle that a party is generally bound by its pleadings and is not entitled to lead evidence which contradicts the pleaded case during the trial.
In the circumstances, the court concluded that the RAF was absolved from liability.
This judgment underscores a critical principle: the RAF is an insurer designed to compensate victims of negligent driving, not intentional wrongdoing. Where a motor vehicle is deliberately used as a weapon, the injured party’s remedy lies in a common-law delictual claim against the perpetrator, not against the RAF. The decision also serves as a cautionary reminder on the importance of precise pleadings and the distinction between negligence and intention in delictual claims.
