Does interest on an award of general damages accrue from the date of demand or the service of summons, or does it accrue only from the date a court quantifies the award? Despite its practical significance, this question has remained unresolved in civil litigation for many years.
On 29 June 2026, the Constitutional Court handed down judgment in Minister of Police v Khedama [2026] ZACC 27, providing much-needed clarity on when interest should begin to accrue on awards of general damages under the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55 of 1975 (the PRI Act).
The court unanimously held that, where general (non-patrimonial) damages are assessed according to the value of money at the date of judgment, interest should ordinarily run from the date of judgment until payment, rather than from the date of demand or the service of summons. The decision resolves a long-standing divergence in the case law and has important implications for the calculation of damages in delictual claims.
Ms Cynthia Nobuhle Khedama instituted proceedings against the Minister of Police following her unlawful arrest and detention in December 2011. After liability was conceded, the High Court awarded her ZAR 1 million in general damages together with interest from the date on which summons was served. On appeal, the Full Court reduced the award to ZAR 350,000 and ordered that interest run from the date of judgment. The Supreme Court of Appeal increased the award to ZAR 580,000 but restored interest from the date of service of summons.
The Minister appealed only the issue of interest, leaving the ZAR 580,000 quantum award undisturbed. The Constitutional Court was therefore required to determine whether interest on an award of general damages should commence in accordance with the default position under section 2A(2)(a) of the PRI Act or whether it should run only from the date judgment was granted.
The court's decision
The Constitutional Court distinguished between pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. Pecuniary losses, such as medical expenses and loss of earnings, are generally quantified by reference to historical financial loss. General damages, however, compensate non-patrimonial harm, including pain and suffering, loss of dignity and deprivation of liberty, and are ordinarily assessed according to the value of money prevailing when judgment is delivered.
The Constitutional Court held that awarding interest from the date of demand or the service of summons on an amount already assessed in present-day monetary terms would compensate a claimant twice for the same period. Rather than applying section 2A(2)(a) mechanically, the Constitutional Court pointed to section 2A(5), which empowers courts to determine what is just regarding both the rate of interest and the date from which it should run. Accordingly, where general damages are assessed at current monetary values, interest should ordinarily run only from the date of judgment until payment.
Leave to appeal was granted in part because the Constitutional Court's own prior decisions had pointed in different directions without explanation. In De Klerk v Minister of Police [2019] ZACC 32, interest ran from the date of service of summons, while in Mahlangu v Minister of Police [2021] ZACC 10, interest ran only from the date of the High Court's judgment. Neither judgment explained the basis for the selected date. This unexplained divergence at the apex court, compounded by conflicting Supreme Court of Appeal authority, made the matter one of general public importance warranting clarification.
Departure from the previous position
Prior to this judgment, the prevailing interpretation of section 2A was that interest on an unliquidated debt generally accrued from the date of a proper written demand or the service of summons, whichever occurred first. That approach was established by the Supreme Court of Appeal in David Trust and Others v Aegis Insurance Co Ltd and Others 2000 (3) SA 289 (SCA), Adel Builders (Pty) Ltd v Thompson 2000 (4) SA 1027 (SCA) and Drake Flemmer & Orsmond Inc v Gajjar 2018 (3) SA 353 (SCA) and was most recently applied by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Khedama v Minister of Police 2025 JDR 2465 (SCA).
While those decisions recognised the court's discretion under section 2A(5), the Constitutional Court has now clarified that, in relation to awards of general damages assessed using present-day monetary values, the ordinary position is different. Importantly, the Constitutional Court did not overrule the earlier authorities insofar as they relate to unliquidated pecuniary claims. Those principles remain applicable where damages are assessed according to historical monetary values.
The Constitutional Court also pointed out that the Supreme Court of Appeal had erred in treating Drake Flemmer as authority for awarding interest on Ms Khedama's general damages from the date of summons. That case concerned contractual (pecuniary) damages assessed at the date of breach, not general damages assessed at the date of judgment and was therefore distinguishable.
Practical implications
This judgment will have immediate implications for litigation involving unlawful arrest and detention, medical negligence, assault, defamation; sexual offences and other delictual claims in which general damages are sought.
For plaintiffs, the decision means that pre-judgment interest will generally no longer accrue on awards of general damages assessed in present-day monetary terms. For defendants, particularly organs of state and insurers, the judgment significantly reduces exposure to substantial pre-judgment interest. More broadly, the decision provides welcome certainty on the proper exercise of the discretion conferred by section 2A(5) of the PRI Act.
Key takeaway
Minister of Police v Khedama is now the leading authority on the commencement of interest on awards of general damages. The Constitutional Court has confirmed that, where general damages are assessed according to current monetary values, interest should ordinarily run from the date of judgment until payment. In doing so, the Constitutional Court has aligned the law on interest with the principles governing the assessment of general damages and brought clarity to an area of law that has produced conflicting decisions for more than two decades.
The full judgment can be accessed here.
