Our courts are often called upon to decide whether legal action has been instituted timeously. The issue arose again in Mafuyeka v Minister of Health and Others (2133/2022) [2025] ZAMPMBHC (10 December 2025, where the High Court delivered judgment on special pleas raised by the defendants, including a special plea of prescription.
The matter arose from an incident on 1 June 2014, when the plaintiff was employed as a nurse by the first defendant and posted to the Thulamahashe Community Health Centre. On that date, the plaintiff was physically attacked by a member of the public who accused him of having caused a patient’s death. The plaintiff subsequently instituted a claim for ZAR 10 million for injuries allegedly arising from the incident. Summons was served on the defendants on 20 May 2022.
The plaintiff contended that the running of prescription had been interrupted by an express or tacit acknowledgment of debt by the first defendant, his employer, when signing documentation for purposes of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 (COIDA). Alternatively, the plaintiff argued that prescription could only commence once the criminal trial against his assailant had been finalised. Finally, he contended that, prior to consulting with counsel in January 2022, he was unaware that he had a civil claim against his employer and that his right of action therefore only became enforceable in 2022.
The court rejected these arguments. It held that the COIDA documentation signed by the employer did not constitute an express or tacit acknowledgement of liability. The court further found that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to await the outcome of the criminal proceedings before instituting civil action, particularly as the action was not brought against the National Prosecuting Authority. In addition, the court confirmed that the prescription is not interrupted merely because a party has not yet consulted with legal practitioners or experts, as such an approach would undermine the purpose of prescription legislation.
The court reiterated that prescription begins to run once a creditor has knowledge of the facts from which the debt arises. Such facts do not include knowledge that the debtor's conduct was wrongful or negligent, that the creditor has a right to sue, or any conclusions of law.
The plaintiff was found to have been aware of the material facts giving rise to his claim as early as 2014 and to have acquired the minimum facts necessary to institute action at the time.
Accordingly, the court held that prescription commenced running in 2014 and was not interrupted. The special plea of prescription was upheld, and the plaintiff’s claim was dismissed with costs.
